An analysis of the "Shaft" distributed denial of service tool. Shaftnode was recovered initially in November, 1999. Distinctive features are the ability to switch handler servers and handler ports on the fly, making detection by intrusion detection tools difficult from that perspective, a "ticket" mechanism to link transactions, and the particular interest in packet statistics, showing the "yield" of the DDoS network as a whole.
0af9ed12f935a568a43097d26109b009fa5aa5c7d137a97c98d2ea3460c2395a================================================================================
An analysis of the ``Shaft'' distributed denial of service tool
================================================================================
Sven Dietrich
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
<spock@sled.gsfc.nasa.gov>
Neil Long
Oxford University
<neil.long@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk>
David Dittrich
University of Washington
<dittrich@cac.washington.edu>
Copyright 2000. All rights reserved.
March 13, 2000
-- 1. Introduction
------------------
This is an analysis of the "Shaft" distributed denial of service
(DDoS) tool. Denial of service is a technique to deny access to a
resource by overloading it, such as packet flooding in the network
context. Denial of service tools have existed for a while, whereas
distributed variants are relatively recent. The distributed nature
adds the "many to one" relationship. Throughout this analysis, most
actual host names have been modified or removed.
-- 2. Historical overview
-------------------------
"Shaft" belongs in the family of tools discussed earlier, such as
Trinoo, TFN, Stacheldraht, and TFN2K. Like in those tools, there are
handler (or master) and agent programs. The general concepts of these
tools can be found in a Distributed Intruder Tools Workshop Report held
in November 1999 at the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination
Center (CERT/CC) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop.pdf
In chronological order, there are Trinoo, TFN, Stacheldraht, Shaft, and
TFN2K. Trinoo, TFN, and Stacheldraht were analyzed in [5], [6], and [7]
respectively. TFN2K was recently analyzed in [1].
In the first two months of 2000, DDoS attacks against major Internet
sites (such as CNN, ZDNet, Amazon etc.) have brought these tools
further into the limelight. There are a few papers covering DDoS to
be found at:
http://packetstorm.securify.com/distributed/
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-17-denial-of-service-tools.html
-- 3. Analysis
--------------
Shaftnode was recovered, initially in binary form, in late November
1999, then in source form for the agent. Distinctive features are
the ability to switch handler servers and handler ports on the fly,
making detection by intrusion detection tools difficult from that
perspective, a "ticket" mechanism to link transactions, and the
particular interest in packet statistics.
-- 3.1 The network: client(s)-->handler(s)-->agent(s)-->victim(s)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The "Shaft" network is made up of one or more handler programs
("shaftmaster") and a large set of agents ("shaftnode"). The attacker
uses a telnet program ("client") to connect to and communicate with the
handlers. A "Shaft" network would look like this:
+--------+ +--------+
| client | | client |
+--------+ +--------+
| |
. . . --+------+---------------+------+----------------+-- . . .
| | |
| | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| handler | | handler | | handler |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | |
| | |
. . . ---+------+-----+------------+---+--------+------------+-+-- . . .
| | | | |
| | | | |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
| agent | | agent | | agent | | agent | | agent |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
-- 3.2 Network Communication
----------------------------
Client to handler(s): 20432/tcp
Handler to agent(s): 18753/udp
Agent to handler(s): 20433/udp
"Shaft" (in the analyzed version, 1.72) is modeled after Trinoo, in that
communication between handlers and agents is achieved using the
unreliable IP protocol UDP. See Stevens [18] for an extensive discussion of
the TCP and UDP protocols. Remote control is via a simple telnet connection
to the handler. "Shaft" uses "tickets" for keeping track of its individual
agents. Both passwords and ticket numbers have to match for the agent to
execute the request. A simple letter-shifting (Caesar cipher, see Schneier
[17]) is in use.
-- 3.3 Commands
---------------
The command structure is divided into the agent and handler command
syntax groups. The attacker interacts with the handler via a command
line.
-- 3.3.1 Agent Command Syntax
Accepted by agent and replies generated back to the handler:
size <size>
Size of the flood packets.
Generates a "size" reply.
type <0|1|2|3>
Type of DoS to run
0 UDP, 1 TCP, 2 UDP/TCP/ICMP, 3 ICMP
Generates a "type" reply.
time <length>
Length of DoS in seconds
Generates a "time" reply.
own <victim>
Add victim to list of hosts to perform denial of service on
Generates a "owning" reply.
end <victim>
Removes victim from list of hosts (see "own" above)
Generates a "done" reply.
stat
Requests packet statistics from agent
Generates a "pktstat" reply.
alive
Are you alive?
Generates a "alive blah" reply.
switch <handler> <port>
Switch the agent to a new handler and handler port
Generates a "switching" reply.
pktres <host>
Request packet results for that host at the end of the flood
Generates a "pktres" reply.
Sent by agent:
new <password>
Reporting for duty
pktres <password> <sock> <ticket> <packets sent>
Packets sents to the host identified by <ticket> number
-- 3.3.2 Handler (shaftmaster) Command Syntax
Little is known about the handler, but this is a speculation, pieced
together from clues, of how its command structure could look like:
mdos <host list>
Start a distributed denial of service attack (mdos = massive
denial of service?) directed at <host list>.
Sends out "own host" messages to all agents.
edos <host list>
End the above attack on <host list>.
Sends out "end host" messages to all agents.
time <length>
Set the duration of the attack.
Sends out "time <length>" to all agents.
size <packetsize>
Set the packetsize for the attack (8K maximum as seen in
source).
Sends out "size <packetsize>" to all agents.
type <UDP|TCP|ICMP|BOTH>
Set the type of attack, UDP packet flooding, TCP SYN
packet flooding, ICMP packet flooding, or all three (here
BOTH = ICMP amd IP protocols)
Sends "type <type>" to all agents.
+node <host list>
Add new agents
-node <host list>
Remove agents from pool
ns <host list>
Perform a DNS lookup on <host list>
lnod
List all agents
ltic
List all tickets (transactions?)
pkstat
Show total packet statistics for agents
Sends out "stat" request to all agents.
alive
Send an "alive" to all agents.
A possible argument to alive is "hi"
stat
show status?
switch
become the handler for agents
Send "switch" to all agents.
ver
show version
exit
-- 3.4 Password protection
--------------------------
After connecting to the handler using the telnet client, the attacker
is prompted with "login:". Too little is known about the handler or
its encryption method for logging in. A cleartext connection to the handler
port is obviously a weakness.
-- 3.5 Detection
----------------
-- 3.5.1 Binaries and their behavior
As with previous DDoS tools, the methods used to install the handler/agent
will be the same as installing any program on a compromised Unix system,
with all the standard options for concealing the programs and files (e.g.,
use of hidden directories, "root kits", kernel modules, etc.) The
reader is referred to Dittrich's Trinoo analysis [5] for a description of
possible installation methods of this type of tool.
Precautions have been taken to hide the default handler in the binary code.
In the analyzed code, the default handler is defined as follows:
#define MASTER "23:/33/75/28"
which would translate into 129.22.64.17 (electrochem1.echem.cwru.edu)
using the same simple cipher mentioned above. Port numbers are munged
before actual use, e.g.
#define MASTER_PORT 20483
is really port 20433.
All these techniques intend to hide the critical information from prying
eyes performing forensics on the code. The program itself tries to hide
itself as a legitimate Unix process (httpd in the default configuration).
Looking at strings in the shaftnode application reveals the following:
> strings -n 3 shaftnode
pktres
switch
alive
stat
end
own
time
type
size
httpd
23:/33/75/28
Unable to fork. (do it manually)
shift
new %s
size %s %s %s %s
type %s %s %s %s
time %s %s %s %s
owning %s %s %s %s
switched %s %s %s
done %s %s %s %s
pktstat %s %s %s %lu
alive %s %s %s blah
%d.%d.%d.%d
Error sending tcp packet from %s:%i to %lu:%i
pktres %s %i %i %lu
Upon launch, the "Shaft" agent (the "shaftnode") reports back to its
default handler (its "shaftmaster") by sending a "new <upshifted
password>" command. For the default password of "shift" found in the
analyzed code, this would be "tijgu". Therefore a new agent would send
out "new tijgu", and all subsequent messages would carry that password in
it. Only in one case does the agent shift in the opposite direction for
one particular command, e.g. "pktres rghes". It is unclear at the moment
whether this is intentional or not.
Incoming commands arrive in the format:
"command <upshifted password> <command arg> <socket> <ticket> <optional args>"
For most commands, the password and socket/ticket need to have the right magic
in order to generate a reply and the command to be executed.
Message flow diagram between handler H and agent A:
Initial phase: A -> H: "new", f(password)
Running loop: H -> A: cmd, f(password), [args], Na, Nb
A -> H: cmdrep, f(password), Na, Nb, [args]
- f(X) is the Caesar cipher function on X
- Na, Nb are numbers (tickets, socket numbers)
- cmd, cmdrep are commands and command acknowledgments
- args are command arguments
The flooding occurs in bursts of 100 packets per host, with the source
port and source address randomized. This number is hard-coded, but it is
believed that more flexibility can be added. Whereas the source port
spoofing only works if the agent is running as a root privileged process,
the author has added provisions for packet flooding using the UDP protocol
and with the correct source address in the case the process is running as a
simple user process. It is noteworthy that the random function is not
properly seeded, which may lead to predictable source port sequences and
source host IP sequences.
Source port = (rand() % (65535-1024)+1024) where % is the
mathematical 'mod' operator
This will generate source ports greater than 1024 at all times.
Source IP = rand()%255.rand()%255.rand()%255.rand()%255
The source IP numbers can (and will) contain a zero in the leading
octet.
Additionally, the sequence number for all TCP packets is fixed, namely
0x28374839, which helps with respect to detection at the network level.
The ACK and URGENT flags are randomly set, except on some platforms.
Destination ports for TCP and UDP packet floods are randomized.
The client must choose the duration ("time"), size of packets, and type
of packet flooding directed at the victim hosts. Each set of hosts has its
own duration, which gets divided evenly across all hosts. This is unlike TFN
[2] which forks an individual process for each victim host. For the type,
the client can select UDP, TCP SYN, ICMP packet flooding, or the combination
of all three. Even though there is potential of having a different type and
packet size for each set of victim hosts, this feature is not exploited
in this version.
The author of "Shaft" seems to have a particular interest in statistics,
namely packet generation rates of its individual agents. The statistics on
packet generation rates are possibly used to determine the "yield" of the
DDoS network as a whole. This would allow the attacker to stop adding hosts
to the attack network when it reached the necessary size to overwhelm the
victim network, and to know when it is necessary to add more agents to
compensate for loss of agents due to attrition during an attack (as the
agent systems are identified and taken off-line.)
Currently, the ability to switch host IP and port for the handler exists,
but the listening port for the agent remains the same. It is foreseeable
that this will change in the future.
-- 3.5.2 A sample attack
In this section we will look at a practical example of an attack carried
out with the "Shaft" distributed denial of service attack tool, as seen
from the attacking network perspective.
The shaftnode agent when in use, as seen by "lsof" [10]:
# lsof -c shaftnode
COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE NODE NAME
shaftnode 13489 root cwd VDIR 0,0 400 2 /tmp
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 0,0 19492 10 /tmp (swap)
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 662764 182321 /usr/lib/libc.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 17480 210757 /usr/platform/sun4u/lib/libc_psr.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 566700 182335 /usr/lib/libnsl.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 39932 182348 /usr/lib/libw.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 15720 182334 /usr/lib/libmp.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 15720 182327 /usr/lib/libintl.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 68780 182342 /usr/lib/libsocket.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 2564 182324 /usr/lib/libdl.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root txt VREG 32,0 137160 182315 /usr/lib/ld.so.1
shaftnode 13489 root 0u inet 0x507dc770 0t116 TCP hostname:ftp->electrochem1.echem.cwru.edu:53982 (CLOSE_WAIT)
shaftnode 13489 root 1u inet 0x507dc770 0t116 TCP hostname:ftp->electrochem1.echem.cwru.edu:53982 (CLOSE_WAIT)
shaftnode 13489 root 2u inet 0x507dc770 0t116 TCP hostname:ftp->electrochem1.echem.cwru.edu:53982 (CLOSE_WAIT)
shaftnode 13489 root 3u inet 0x5032c7d8 0t0 UDP *:18753 (Idle)
As one can see, the agent is waiting to receive commands on its default
UDP port number 18753. The TCP connection back to the handler remains
unexplained to date.
Packet flows:
Date Time Protocol Source IP/Port Flow Destination IP/Port
Sun 11/28 21:39:22 tcp 129.22.64.17.53982 <-> x.x.x.x.21
Sun 11/28 21:39:56 udp x.x.x.x.33198 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:45:20 udp 129.22.64.17.1765 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:20 udp x.x.x.x.33199 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1866 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp x.x.x.x.33200 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1968 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1046 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1147 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1248 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:45:59 udp 129.22.64.17.1451 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:46:00 udp x.x.x.x.33201 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:46:00 udp x.x.x.x.33202 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:46:01 udp x.x.x.x.33203 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:48:37 udp 129.22.64.17.1037 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:48:37 udp 129.22.64.17.1239 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:48:37 udp 129.22.64.17.1340 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:48:37 udp 129.22.64.17.1442 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:48:38 udp x.x.x.x.33204 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:48:38 udp x.x.x.x.33205 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:48:38 udp x.x.x.x.33206 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:48:56 udp 129.22.64.17.1644 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:48:56 udp x.x.x.x.33207 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:49:59 udp x.x.x.x.33208 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:50:00 udp x.x.x.x.33209 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
Sun 11/28 21:50:14 udp 129.22.64.17.1747 -> x.x.x.x.18753
Sun 11/28 21:50:14 udp x.x.x.x.33210 -> 129.22.64.17.20433
There is quite some activity between the handler and the agent, as they
go through the command request and acknowledgement phases. There
was also what appeared to be testing of the impact on the local
network itself with ICMP packet flooding, for which we omit the data
here due to size limitations.
Let us look at the individual phases from a later attack.
Setup and configuration phase:
date time src dest dest-port command
4 Dec 1999 18:06:40 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 alive tijgu hi 5 8170
4 Dec 1999 18:09:14 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 time tijgu 700 5 6437
4 Dec 1999 18:09:14 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 time tijgu 5 6437 700
4 Dec 1999 18:09:16 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 size tijgu 4096 5 8717
4 Dec 1999 18:09:16 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 size tijgu 5 8717 4096
4 Dec 1999 18:09:23 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 type tijgu 2 5 9003
The handler issues an "alive" command, and says "hi" to its agent,
assigning a socket number of "5" and a ticket number of 8170. We will see
that this "socket number" will persist throughout this attack. A time
period of 700 seconds is assigned to the agent, which is acknowledged. A
packet size of 4096 bytes is specified, which is again confirmed. The
last line indicates the type of attack, in this case "the works", i.e.
UDP, TCP SYN and ICMP packet flooding combined. Failure to specify the type
would make the agent default to UDP packet flooding.
Now the list of hosts to attack and which ones they want statistics from
on completion:
date time src dest dest-port command
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 own tijgu 207.229.143.6 5 5256
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 owning tijgu 5 5256 207.229.143.6
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 pktres tijgu 207.229.143.6 5 1993
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 own tijgu 24.7.231.128 5 78
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 pktres tijgu 24.218.58.101 5 8845
4 Dec 1999 18:09:24 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 own tijgu 18.85.13.107 5 6247
4 Dec 1999 18:09:25 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 own tijgu 24.218.52.44 5 4190
4 Dec 1999 18:09:25 129.22.64.17 x.x.x.x 18753 own tijgu 207.175.72.15 5 2376
4 Dec 1999 18:09:25 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 owning tijgu 5 78 24.7.231.128
4 Dec 1999 18:09:26 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 owning tijgu 5 6247 18.85.13.107
4 Dec 1999 18:09:27 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 owning tijgu 5 4190 24.218.52.44
4 Dec 1999 18:09:28 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 owning tijgu 5 2376 207.175.72.15
4 Dec 1999 18:21:04 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 pktres rghes 5 1993 51600
4 Dec 1999 18:21:04 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 pktres rghes 0 0 51400
4 Dec 1999 18:21:07 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 pktres rghes 0 0 51500
4 Dec 1999 18:21:07 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 pktres rghes 0 0 51400
4 Dec 1999 18:21:07 x.x.x.x 129.22.64.17 20433 pktres rghes 0 0 51400
Now that all other parameters are set, the handler issues several "own"
commands, in effect specifying the victim hosts. Those commands are
acknowledged by the agent with an "owning" reply. The flooding occurs as
soon as the first victim host gets added. The handler also requests
packet statistics from the agents for certain victim hosts (e.g. "pktres
tijgu 207.229.143.6 5 1993"). Note that the reply comes back with the
same identifiers ("5 1993") at the end of the 700 second packet flood,
indicating that 51600 sets of packets were sent. One should realize that,
if successful, this means 51600 x 3 packets due to the configuration of
all three (UDP, TCP, and ICMP) types of packets. In turn, this results
in roughly 220 4096 byte packets per second per host, or about 900
kilobytes per second per victim host from this agent alone, about 4.5
megabytes per second total for this little exercise.
Note the reverse shift ("shift" becomes "rghes", rather than "tijgu") for
the password on the packet statistics.
-- 3.5.3 Detection at the network level
Scanning the network for open port 20432 will reveal the presence of a
handler on your LAN.
For detecting idle agents, one could write a program similar to George
Weaver's trinoo detector. Sending out "alive" messages with the default
password to all nodes on a network on the default UDP port 18753 will
generate traffic back to the detector, making the agent believe the
detector is a handler.
This program does not provide for code updates (like TFN or Stacheldraht).
This may imply "rcp" or "ftp" connections during the initial
intrusion phase (see also [5]).
The program uses UDP traffic for its communication between the handlers
and the agents. Considering that the traffic is not encrypted, it can
easily be detected based on certain keywords. Performing an "ngrep" [11]
for the keywords mentioned in the syntax sections (3.3.1 and 3.3.2), will
locate the control traffic, and looking for TCP packets with sequence
numbers of 0x28374839 may locate the TCP SYN packet flood traffic.
Source ports are always above 1024, and source IP numbers can
include zeroes in the leading octet.
Strings in this control traffic can be detected with the "ngrep"
program using the same technique shown in [5], [6], and [7]. For
example,
# ngrep -i -x "alive tijgu" udp
# ngrep -i -x "pktres|pktstat" udp
will locate the control traffic between the handler and the agent,
independently of the port number used.
There are also two excellent scanners for detecting DDoS agents on the
network: Dittrich's "dds" [8] and Brumley's "rid" [2].
"dds" was written to provide a more portable and less dependant
means of scanning for various DDoS tools. (Many people encountered
problems with Perl and the Net::RawIP library [15] on their systems,
which prevented them from using the scripts provided in [5], [6],
and [7].) Due to time contraints during coding, "dds" does not have
the flexibility necessary to specify arbitrary protocols, ports, and
payloads. A modified version of "dds", geared towards detecting only
"Shaft" agents, is included in the Appendix.
A better means of detecting "Shaft" handlers and agents would be to
use a program like "rid", which uses a more flexible configuration
file mechanism to define ports, protocols, and payloads.
A sample configuration for "rid" to detect the "Shaft" control traffic
as described:
start shaft
send udp dport=18753 data="alive tijgu hi 5 1918"
recv udp sport=20433 data="alive" nmatch=1
end shaft
-- 3.6 Defenses
---------------
To protect against the effects of the multiple types of denial of
service, we suggest that you review the other papers (see [1, 3, 5, 6,
7]) and other methods of dealing with DDoS attacks being discussed
and promoted (see [9]).
For example, rate-limiting is considered effective against ICMP packet
flooding attacks, while anti-spoof filters and egress filters at the
border routers can limit the problems caused by attacking agents
faking source addresses.
-- 4. Further evolution
-----------------------
While the author(s) of this tool did not pursue the use of encryption
of its control traffic, such an evolution is conceivable, since a Caesar
cipher is used to obfuscate the password. A transition to Blowfish or
other stream ciphers is realistic, and changing the communication protocol
to ICMP, much like TFN, is conceivable. The use of multicast protocols
for both communication or packet flooding is also possible.
To date, no source for the "Shaft" handler ("shaftmaster") has been
obtained of analyzed.
At this stage, the code is believed to be private. This would mean that
the authors could likely change defaults and the probability of detecting
"script kiddie" copycats using default values as analyzed here is low.
This would argue for rapid and widespread detection efforts to identify
agents before this change.
-- 5. Conclusion
----------------
"Shaft" is another DDoS variant with independent origins. The code
recovered did appear to be still in development. Several key
features indicate evolutionary trends as the genre develops.
Of significance is the priority placed on packet generation
statistics which would allow host selection to be refined. The
analysis of the code and binary was greatly enhanced by the capture
of attack preparation and command packets. The captured packets
made it possible to assess the impact of a single agent that managed
to saturate the network pipe.
The version analyzed had hooks which would allow for dynamic changes
to the master host and control port but not the agent control port.
However such items are trivially incorporated and must not be taken
to be indicative of any current versions which may be in active use.
The obfuscation of master IP, ports and passwords used a relatively
simple form of encryption but this could easily be strengthened.
The detection of DDoS installations will become very much more
difficult as such metamorphosis techniques progress, the presence of
such agents will still be more readily determined by analysis of
traffic anomalies with a consequent pressure on time and resources
for site administrators and security teams.
-- APPENDIX A: References
-------------------------
[1] Barlow, Jason and Woody Thrower. TFN2K An Analysis
http://www2.axent.com/swat/News/TFN2k_Analysis.htm
[2] Brumley, David. Remote Intrusion Detector.
http://theorygroup.com/Software/RID
[3] CERT Distributed System Intruder Tools Workshop report
http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop.pdf
[4] CERT Advisory CA-99-17 Denial-of-Service Tools
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-17-denial-of-service-tools.html
[5] Dittrich, David. The DoS Project's "trinoo" distributed denial of service attack tool
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/trinoo.analysis
[6] Dittrich, David. The "Tribe Flood Network" distributed denial of service attack tool
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/tfn.analysis
[7] Dittrich, David. The "Stacheldraht" distributed denial of service attack tool
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/stacheldraht.analysis
[8] Dittrich, David, Marcus Ranum, George Weaver, David Brumley et al.
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/dds
[9] Dittrich, David, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks/Tools
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/
[10] lsof:
http://vic.cc.purdue.edu/
[11] ngrep:
http://www.packetfactory.net/ngrep/
[12] Packet Storm Security, Distributed denial of service attack tools
http://packetstorm.securify.com/distributed/
[13] Phrack Magazine, Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Nine,
File 06 of 16, [ Project Loki ]
http://www.phrack.com/search.phtml?view&article=p49-6
[14] Phrack Magazine Volume 7, Issue 51 September 01, 1997,
article 06 of 17 [ L O K I 2 (the implementation) ]
http://www.phrack.com/search.phtml?view&article=p51-6
[15] Net::RawIP:
http://quake.skif.net/RawIP
[16] tcpdump:
ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/tcpdump.tar.Z
[17] Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography, 2nd edition, Wiley.
[18] Stevens, W. Richard and Gary R. Wright. TCP/IP Illustrated, Vol. I, II,
and III., Addison-Wesley.
[19] Zuckerman, M.J. Net hackers develop destructive new tools. USA Today,
7 December 1999.
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/review/crg681.htm
-- APPENDIX B: dds ("Shaft" only variant)
/*
* dds $Revision: 1.6s $ - a distributed DoS tool scanner - Shaft only
*
* Based on the gag scanner, written by David Dittrich, University
* of Washington, Marcus Ranum, Network Flight Recorder, with
* code contributed by others, and based on an idea stolen from
* George Weaver, Pennsylvania State University.
*
* Dave Dittrich <dittrich@cac.washington.edu>
* Marcus Ranum <mjr@nfr.net>
* George Weaver <gmw@psu.edu>
* David Brumley <dbrumley@rtfm.stanford.edu>
*/
/* Shaft only version, modified to that effect by
* Sven Dietrich <spock@sled.gsfc.nasa.gov>
*/
#if YOU_HAVE_NOT_READ_THIS_YET
This software should only be used in compliance with all applicable laws and
the policies and preferences of the owners of any networks, systems, or hosts
scanned with the software
The developers and licensors of the software provide the software on an "as
is" basis, excluding all express or implied warranties, and will not be liable
for any damages arising out of or relating to use of the software.
THIS SOFTWARE IS MADE AVAILABLE "AS IS", AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND IN NO EVENT SHALL THE UNIVERSITY OF
WASHINGTON BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE) OR STRICT LIABILITY, ARISING
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
#endif
#define VERSION "$Revision: 1.6s $"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
#define BS 1024
#define __FAVOR_BSD
/* The two arrays below are for address range calculations. They
should have been automatically generated, but
1) I am lazy.
2) There are a few special cases in them.
I will not scan more than a /16. When we do scan a CIDR block, we
assume that it actually is a CIDR block, and do not scan the
network or broadcast address.
*/
static unsigned long MaskBits[] = {
0x00000000, /* /0 */
0x00000000, /* /1 */
0x00000000, /* /2 */
0x00000000, /* /3 */
0x00000000, /* /4 */
0x00000000, /* /5 */
0x00000000, /* /6 */
0x00000000, /* /7 */
0x00000000, /* /8 */
0x00000000, /* /9 */
0x00000000, /* /10 */
0x00000000, /* /11 */
0x00000000, /* /12 */
0x00000000, /* /13 */
0x00000000, /* /14 */
0x00000000, /* /15 */
0xffff0000, /* /16, Class B */
0xffff8000, /* /17, 128 * Class C */
0xffffc000, /* /18, 64 * Class C */
0xffffe000, /* /19, 32 * Class C */
0xfffff000, /* /20, 16 * Class C */
0xfffff800, /* /21, 8 * Class C */
0xfffffc00, /* /22, 4 * Class C */
0xfffffe00, /* /23, 2* Class C */
0xffffff00, /* /24, Class C */
0xffffff80, /* /25, 128 hosts */
0xffffffc0, /* /26, 64 hosts */
0xffffffe0, /* /27, 32 hosts */
0xfffffff0, /* /28, 16 hosts */
0xfffffff8, /* /29, 8 hosts */
0xfffffffc, /* /30, 4 hosts (PPP link) */
0xfffffffe, /* /31, invalid */
0xffffffff, /* /32, host */
};
static int NumHosts[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, /* don't scan more than a /16 */
65534, /* These are all -2 so that we don't
scan the broadcast addr or the
network addr */
32766,
16382,
8190,
4094,
2046,
1022,
510,
254,
126,
62,
30,
14,
6,
2,
0,
1,
};
extern char *optarg;
struct udppkt_t {
struct ip ipi;
struct udphdr udpi;
char buffer[BS];
} udppkt;
static void listener();
static int usage();
static int vflg = 0; /* verbosity */
static int dflg = 0; /* debugging */
/* shaft variables */
static short shaft_dstport = 18753; /* handler listen port */
static short shaft_rctport = 20433; /* agent listen port */
char shaft_scmd[] = "alive";
char shaft_spass[] = "tijgu";
char shaft_echostr[] = "alive";
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int pid, host;
char target[128];
unsigned long target_host;
struct in_addr target_ip;
int mask;
char * mask_ptr;
int result;
int usock;
char buf[BS];
struct sockaddr_in
usa;
int i;
char *jnk1;
char *jnk2;
int sleepytime = 500;
int bigsleep = 30;
int num_hosts;
char scmd[BS], spass[BS], sbuf[BS];
while((i = getopt(argc,argv,"ds:S:v")) != -1) {
switch(i) {
case 'd':
dflg++;
break;
case 's':
sleepytime = atoi(optarg);
if(sleepytime <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"WARNING: zero interping sleep time will probably overflow your sy
stem's transmit buffers and yield poor results\n");
sleepytime = 1;
}
break;
case 'S':
bigsleep = atoi(optarg);
if(bigsleep <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"WARNING: negative sleep value - staying with default of %d\n", bi
gsleep);
}
break;
case 'v':
vflg++;
break;
default:
exit(usage());
}
}
if(optind >= argc || argc - optind > 1)
exit(usage());
mask_ptr = strchr(argv[optind], '/');
/* if a CIDR block is passed in */
if (mask_ptr) {
*mask_ptr = '\0';
mask_ptr ++;
sscanf(mask_ptr, "%d", &mask);
} else {
printf("No mask passed, assuming host scan (/32)\n");
mask = 32;
}
result = inet_aton(argv[optind], &target_ip);
if (result == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Bad IP address: %s\n", argv[0],
argv[optind]);
exit(-1);
}
if (mask < 16) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad Network Admin! Bad! Do not scan more than a /16 at once!\n");
exit(-1);
}
num_hosts = NumHosts[mask];
if (num_hosts == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot scan a /%d. Exiting...\n", mask);
exit(-1);
}
if(vflg) {
printf("Mask: %d\n", mask);
printf("Target: %s\n", inet_ntoa(target_ip));
printf("dds %s - scanning...\n\n", VERSION);
}
sprintf(sbuf,"%s %s hi 5 1918",shaft_scmd,shaft_spass);
target_host = ntohl(target_ip.s_addr);
target_host &= MaskBits[mask];
target_ip.s_addr = htonl(target_host);
if((pid = fork()) < 0) {
perror("cannot fork");
exit(1);
}
/* child side listens for return packets */
if (pid == 0)
listener();
sleep(1);
/* main sweep loop - COULD be expanded to whole Internet but... */
/* but that would be _very_ bad.... */
while (num_hosts) {
if (mask != 32) {
target_host ++;
}
target_ip.s_addr = htonl(target_host);
num_hosts--;
/* we really need to skip the network and broadcast addresses */
if ((target_host & 0xff) == 0 || (target_host & 0xff) == 0xff) {
if(vflg)
printf("Skipping special address %s\n", inet_ntoa(target_ip));
continue;
}
if(vflg)
printf("Probing address %s\n", inet_ntoa(target_ip));
/* shaft check */
bzero((char *) &usa, sizeof(usa));
usa.sin_family = AF_INET;
usa.sin_addr.s_addr = target_ip.s_addr;
usa.sin_port = htons(shaft_dstport);
if (dflg)
fprintf(stderr,"Sending UDP to: %s\n",
inet_ntoa(usa.sin_addr));
if ((usock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) {
perror("cannot open UDP socket");
exit(1);
}
i = sendto(usock,sbuf,strlen(sbuf), 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&usa,
sizeof(usa));
if (i < 0) {
char ebuf[BS];
sprintf(ebuf,"sendto: udp %s",
inet_ntoa(usa.sin_addr));
perror(ebuf);
break;
}
close(usock);
usleep(sleepytime);
}
/* wait for any late responses */
if (dflg)
fprintf(stderr,"Waiting %d seconds for late responses.\n",
bigsleep);
sleep(bigsleep);
/* shut listener. if this fails the listener exits on its own */
(void)kill(pid, SIGHUP);
exit(0);
}
static void listener()
{
int usock;
int i, len;
fd_set fdset;
char buf[BS];
char rcmd[BS], filler[BS], rpass[BS];
struct timeval timi;
struct udppkt_t
upacket;
struct sockaddr_in
sa, from;
/* child becomes a listener process */
if ((usock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) {
perror("cannot open raw UDP listen socket");
exit(1);
}
bzero((char *) &sa, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
sa.sin_port = htons(shaft_rctport);
if (bind(usock, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
perror("cannot bind to socket");
exit(-1);
}
while (1) {
/* if parent has exitted, die */
if(getppid() == 1)
exit(0);
FD_ZERO(&fdset);
FD_SET(usock, &fdset);
timi.tv_sec = 1;
timi.tv_usec = 0;
select(FD_SETSIZE, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timi);
usleep(100);
if (FD_ISSET (usock, &fdset)) {
/* read data from UDP listen socket */
memset((void *) &upacket, 0, sizeof(struct udppkt_t));
len = sizeof(from);
#if 1
if ((i = recvfrom(usock, buf, BS, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &from, &len)) < 0) {
perror("recvfrom");
continue;
}
#else
i = read (usock, (char *) buf, BS) -
(sizeof (struct ip) + sizeof (struct udphdr));
#endif
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = upacket.ipi.ip_src.s_addr;
if(dflg)
fprintf(stderr,
"Listener got a UDP packet on port %s\n",
shaft_rctport);
/* shaft check */
if (strstr(buf,shaft_echostr)) {
printf("Received '%s' from %s",
shaft_echostr,
inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
printf(" - probable shaft agent\n");
}
else {
printf("Unexpected UDP packet received on port %d from %s\n",
shaft_rctport, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
}
}
}
}
static int
usage()
{
fprintf(stderr,"usage: dds [options] <target>\n");
fprintf(stderr,"target is CIDR block to scan in form:\n");
fprintf(stderr,"\tA.B.C.D/mask\n");
fprintf(stderr,"Options:\n");
fprintf(stderr,"\t[-v] turns on verbosity\n");
fprintf(stderr,"\t[-d] turns on debugging\n");
fprintf(stderr,"\t[-s] interpacket sleep in microseconds\n");
fprintf(stderr,"\t[-S] delay for late packets\n");
return(1);
}
---
Dr. Sven Dietrich Raytheon ITSS | spock@sled.gsfc.nasa.gov
ESDIS Project, Code 586, Blg 32 Rm N231 | +1-301-614-5119 | 614-5270 Fax
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center | Greenbelt, MD 20771, USA
© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed